(to be completed)
Philosophy
• Bermúdez, J. L. (2003). Thinking without words. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
• Clark, A. (1997). Being there : Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
• Cooper, W. S. (2001). The evolution of reason : Logic as a branch of biology. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Davidson, D. (2004). Problems of rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea : Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). Complexity and the function of mind in nature. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Hempel, C. G. ([1961]2001). Rational action. In J. H. Fetzer (Ed.), The philosophy of carl g. Hempel: Studies in science, explanation, and rationality (pp. 311-328). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation, and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York,: Free Press.
• Papineau, D. (2003). The roots of reason : Philosophical essays on rationality, evolution, and probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Satz, D., & Ferejohn, J. (1994). Rational choice and social theory. The Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), 71-87.
• Stein, E. (1996). Without good reason : The rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sterelny, K. (2001). The evolution of agency and other essays. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Thagard, P., & Kroon, F. (2006). Hot thought : Mechanisms and applications of emotional cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Psychology
• Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H., & Tversky, A. (1988). Decision making : Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Camerer, C. (2000). Prospect theory in the wild. In D. Kahneman & A. Tversky (Eds.), Choice, values, and frames (pp. 288-300). New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Kagel, J. H., Battalio, R. C., Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1981). Demand curves for animal consumers. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96(1), 1-16.
• Kahneman, D. (1994). New challenges to the rationality assumption. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150, 18-36.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. The Quartely Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. The Quartely Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty : Heuristics and biases. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty : Heuristics and biases. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Roe, R. M., Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (2001). Multialternative decision field theory: A dynamic connectionist model of decision making. Psychol Rev, 108(2), 370-392.
• Shafir, E., & LeBoeuf, R. A. (2002). Rationality. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 491-517.
• Simon, H. A. (1986). Rationality in psychology and economics. The Journal of Business, 59(4), S209-S224.
• Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1974). Who accepts savage’s axiom? Behavioral Science, 19, 368- 373.
• Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 76, 31-48.
• Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
• Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. The Journal of Business, 59(4), S251-S278.
• Tversky, A., Slovic, P., & Kahneman, D. (1990). The causes of preference reversal. The American Economic Review, 80(1), 204-217.
Economics
• Case, K., & Fair, R. (1992). Principles of economics (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
• Kreps, D. M. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
• Ross, D. (2005). Economic theory and cognitive science : Microexplanation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
• Samuelson, P. A. (1947). Foundations of economic analysis. Cambridge,: Harvard University Press.
• Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
• Smith, V. L. (1990). Experimental economics. Aldershot, Hants, England: Gower Pub. Co.
• Stewart, H. (1995). A critique of instrumental reason in economics. Economics and Philosophy, 11, 57-83.
• Sugden, R. (1991). Rational choice: A survey of contributions from economics and philosophy. The Economic Journal, 101(407), 751-785.
• Thaler, R. H. (1991). Quasi rational economics. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
• Vanberg, V. J. (2004). The rationality postulate in economics: Its ambiguity, its deficiency and its evolutionary alternative. Journal of Economic Methodology, 11(1), 1 – 29.
• Vega-Redondo, F. (2003). Economics and the theory of games. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1953[1944]). Theory of games and economic behavior (3d ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Neuroscience & Neuroeconomics
• Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997). Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy. Science, 275(5304), 1293-1295.
• Braeutigam, S. (2005). Neuroeconomics–from neural systems to economic behaviour. Brain Res Bull, 67(5), 355-360.
• Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2004). Neuroeconomics: Why economics needs brains. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3), 555-579.
• Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error : Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Putnam.
• Damasio, A. R. (2003). Looking for spinoza : Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain (1st ed.). Orlando, Fla. ; London: Harcourt.
• Damasio, A. R., Everitt, B. J., & Bishop, D. (1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex and discussion. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 351(1346, Executive and Cognitive Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex), 1413-1420.
• Glimcher, P. W. (2003). Decisions, uncertainty, and the brain : The science of neuroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press.
• Glimcher, P. W. (2003). Decisions, uncertainty, and the brain : The science of neuroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press.
• Glimcher, P. W., & Rustichini, A. (2004). Neuroeconomics: The consilience of brain and decision. Science, 306(5695), 447-452.
• LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The emotional brain : The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• Lee, D. (2005). Neuroeconomics: Making risky choices in the brain. Nat Neurosci, 8(9), 1129-1130
• McCoy, A. N., & Platt, M. L. (2004). Expectations and outcomes: Decision-making in the primate brain. J Comp Physiol A Neuroethol Sens Neural Behav Physiol.
• Panksepp, J., Knutson, B., & Burgdorf, J. (2002). The role of brain emotional systems in addictions: A neuro-evolutionary perspective and new ’self-report’ animal model. Addiction, 97(4), 459-469.
