February 28, 2007
Notes are here, and reading there:
• Clark, Andy (1996) Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External Structure, in J. Drobak and J. Nye (eds) The Frontiers Of The New Institutional Economics (Academic Press: San Diego, CA 1996) p. 269-290
February 14, 2007
Please note that our next meeting will be on March 1st, same hours, same room. Have a good reading week!
February 12, 2007
IMPORTANT: please note that this week’s meeting will be held on the departmental reading room (HH-335), on Tuesday (Feb.13) at 1pm.
February 12, 2007
7- Evolution and economic rationality
• Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the invisible hand. The American Economic Review, 84(2), 327-332.
• Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich, Rationality and Psychology, in Alfred Mele & Piers Rawling, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford Reference Library. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2004. Pp. 279-300
February 8, 2007
“Reply to Morton White,” (1998, 664-5):
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures. For me, normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking, or, in more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. Like any technology, it makes free use of whatever scientific findings may suit its purpose. It draws upon mathematics in computing standard deviation and probable error and in scouting the gambler’s fallacy. It draws upon experimental psychology in exposing perceptual illusions, and upon cognitive psychology in scouting wishful thinking. It draws upon neurology and physics, in a general way, in discounting testimony from occult or parapsychological sources. There is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed.
(Pursuit of Truth, p.19).
Insofar as theoretical epistemology gets naturalised into a chapter of theoretical science, so normative epistemology gets naturalised into a chapter of engineering: the technology of anticipating sensory stimulation.
Quine, W. V. O. (1986). Reply to morton white. In L. E. Hahn & P. A. Schilpp (Eds.), The philosophy of WVO Quine (pp. 663-665). La Salle: Open Court.
Quine, W. V. O. (1990). Pursuit of truth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
February 6, 2007
- Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421-441.
- Craver, C. F. (2001). Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarchy. Philosophy of Science, 68, 53-74.
- Craver, C. F. (2002). Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory. Philosophy of Science, 69, S83–S97.
- Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67,Von Eckardt, B., & Poland, J. S. (2004). Mechanism and explanation in cognitive neuroscience. Philosophy of Science, 71, 972-984.
- Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Salmon, W. C. (1998). Causality and explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature’s capacities and their measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The dappled world : A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge, UK New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Giere, R. N. (1999). Science without laws. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere, R. N. (2004). How models are used to represent reality. Philosophy of Science, 71(5), 742-752.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosophers’ Imprint, 5(6).
Humphreys, P. (1995). Computational science and scientific method. Minds and Machines, 5(4), 499.
Humphreys, P. (2004). Extending ourselves : Computational science, empiricism, and scientific method. New York: Oxford University Press.
Morgan, M. S., & Morrison, M. (1999). Models as mediators : Perspectives on natural and social sciences. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1987). False models as a means to truer theories. In M. Nitecki & A. Hoffmann (Eds.), Neutral models in biology (pp. 23-55). Oxford: Oxford University Press.